After the meeting, Copeland contacted Drexel's Dehnert and urged him to reconsider the decision to terminate Birmingham Wholesale. Following receipt of the letter, Copeland met with McLeod. The letter also threatened litigation against Masco and Drexel if a solution acceptable to McLeod was not reached. In April, 1989, Birmingham Wholesale's McLeod sent Masco's Copeland a letter that proposed a method for Drexel to acquire Birmingham Wholesale's total inventory of Drexel furniture. Accordingly, the district court properly allowed the jury to determine the damages Oxford had sustained. This instruction prevented any double recovery by Oxford and satisfied the requirements of Deupree.

The jury awarded $1,473,000, all of which was included in the award on the contract claim. In this case, the district court, with agreement of the parties, instructed the jury that any damages awarded under the fraudulent suppression claim would be included in the damages awarded under the contract claim. Under Alabama law, however, a single transaction can support an award of damages for both breach of contract and fraud as long as the judge instructs the jury that there can be no double recovery. Therefore, there can be no fraudulent suppression damages where contract damages are awarded. Therefore, we find that the district court properly allowed the jury to determine if McLeod's threats were material.ДЄs to the fourth element, damages, Drexel argues that any damages arising from a claim of fraudulent suppression must necessarily be subsumed within the breach of contract claim. This meeting occurred after Oxford was advised that McLeod had been terminated and that everything was proceeding, despite McLeod's communication of serious threats.

Indeed, under Drexel's version of events, the contract was not formed until the April market meeting. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 611 So.2d 238, 244 (Ala.1992), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a 'representation that causes a person to do nothing more than he was already contractually obligated to do before the representation was made is not material and therefore cannot support a fraud action.' In the present case, however, it is uncertain when the contract was formed. Materiality is generally a question for the jury. The Alabama courts have defined materiality as 'a fact of such a nature as to induce action on the part of the complaining party.' Bank of Red Bay, 482 So.2d at 282. Hence, the district court properly allowed the jury to determine if the length of time between McLeod's threats and disclosure to Oxford amounted to nondisclosure. According to Chew's testimony, Oxford did not learn of McLeod's statements to Drexel until May 19, 1989, several weeks after McLeod's threats. The second element of a fraudulent suppression claim is the nondisclosure of a material fact. Drexel was represented by Tom Skipper, vice president of sales, Doug Lybrook, southeastern sales manager, and Max McClain, Birmingham sales representative. Oxford was represented at the meeting by Chew and Kitchen. These discussions led to a January 4, 1989, meeting between Oxford and Drexel. During the second round of discussions, Chew informed Drexel that he would open a showcase store only if Oxford was granted exclusivity in the Birmingham market. The first discussions in 1985-86 had terminated because Drexel was unwilling to terminate Birmingham Wholesale as its dealer and grant Oxford the exclusive Birmingham market for Drexel furniture. This was the second time Drexel and Oxford had discussed the opening of a showcase store by Oxford. In the fall of 1988, Drexel and Oxford initiated discussions concerning the opening of a Drexel showcase store at one of Oxford's locations. During the 1980's, Drexel began opening retail 'showcase' stores devoted exclusively to Drexel furniture. For several years prior to 1989, Birmingham Wholesale was a dealer of Drexel furniture in Birmingham.

Drexel heritage furniture inc.